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COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J.:
Plaintiff-appellant

Charles

Murray,

administrator

of

the

estate of Sam Sheppard ("estate"), appeals from the jury's verdict
denying the estate's claim for relief.

We find no merit to the

appeal and affirm.
On December 21, 1954, Dr. Samuel Sheppard was convicted of the
murder of his wife, Marilyn Sheppard, and was sentenced to life in
prison.

After being incarcerated for ten years, his conviction was

reversed and he was granted a

new trial

by the United States

Supreme Court on the basis that he had been denied a fair trial.
Sheppard v. Maxwell

(1966), 384 U.S. 333.

was found not guilty.

Upon retrial, Sheppard

-

He was discharged from prison in 1966 and

died on April 6, 1970.
On October 19, 1995, twenty-five years after Sheppard's death
and almost thirty years after his acquittal, Alan Davis, special
administrator

of

Sheppard's

estate,

1

filed

a

"Petition

for

Declaration of Innocence as a Wrongfully Imprisoned Individual" in
the original criminal case in common pleas court.

1

This petition

Alan Davis died in September 1999, and Charles Murray, the new
administrator, was substituted as a party by the estate on February
12, 2000.

-
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sought to determine that, pursuant to R.C.

2305.02, Sheppard was

innocent and had been wrongfully imprisoned.
Davis subsequently filed a second petition for declaration of
innocence on July 24,

1996 in the civil division of the common

pleas court, after it was determined the action was a civil matter.
On August
alleging that

8,

1996,

the

State moved

to dismiss

the

case,

the petition failed to state a claim upon which

relief could be granted. Specifically, the State alleged that the
petition was barred due to laches, that the statute of limitations
had expired, and that the estate's administrator lacked standing to
file suit on Sheppard's behalf.
to dismiss without opinion.

The trial court denied the motion

The State filed an answer raising as

affirmative defenses the same issues it presented in its motion to
dismiss.
On May 7,
judgment

on

1997,

the

the State filed a Civ.R.

pleadings,

limitations had expired,

again arguing

that

that

12(C)

motion for

the

statute of

the administrator of

the

estate

lacked standing under the wrongful imprisonment statute, and that
laches prevented the claim.

On June 3,

1997,

the trial court

denied the motion.

-

On June 8, 1997, the Prosecuting Attorney for Cuyahoga County
filed a petition for a writ of prohibition with the Ohio Supreme

-
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Court, seeking to prohibit the Honorable Ronald Suster and the the
Cuyahoga

County Court

proceedings,

of Common Pleas

from conducting further

claiming that the lower court lacked jurisdiction.

The arguments in the petition were identical to those raised in
the State's motions before the trial court.
The

Ohio

Supreme

Prosecuting Attorney v.

Court

Suster,

in

State

Judge,

ex

et.

rel.

al.

Tubbs
(1998),

Jones,
84 Ohio

St.3d 70, denied the writ, finding that the issues raised were not
jurisdictional and, therefore, an adequate remedy existed to raise
the arguments on direct appeal.
On September 10, 1999, the State filed a motion for summary
judgment,

again asserting that

the

statute of

-

limitations had

expired, that the administrator of the estate lacked standing, and
that

laches prevented the action.

The trial

court denied the

summary judgment motion without opinion on January 24, 2000.
The case then proceeded to a jury trial on February 7, 2000.
On April 12, 2000,

the jury returned a verdict in favor of the

State.
The estate now appeals and assigns four assignments of
error.
I .

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING LEAVE TO
AMEND ITS ANSWER FOUR YEARS AFTER THE START OF

-
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LITIGATION, HOLDING THAT THE STATE OF OHIO HAS
THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL, AND ALLOWING THE
INSTANT CASE TO BE TRIED BY A JURY.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO ADMIT
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S
PROFFERED
EXPERT
PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY REGARDING THE PROPENSITY
AND
LIKELIHOOD
OF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S
DECEDENT TO COMMIT A CRIME, WHILE ALLOWING
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE TO INTRODUCE EXPERT "CRIME
SCENE ANALYSIS" TESTIMONY BASED ON THE SAME
INFERENCES.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING DEFENDANTAPPELLEE TO READ TRANSCRIBED TESTIMONY TO THE
JURY
FROM THE
CRIMINAL TRIAL
IN WHICH
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S DECEDENT WAS CONVICTED,
ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL WAS REPEATEDLY DECLARED TO
BE CONTAMINATED, AND CONDUCTED IN VIOLATION OF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S
DECEDENT'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY EXCLUDING EVIDENCE
TENDING TO SHOW THAT A THIRD PARTY. COMMITTED
THE CRIME FOR WHICH PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S
WHILE
ALLOWING
WAS
CONVICTED,
DECEDENT
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE TO INTRODUCE PREJUDICIAL
CHARACTER EVIDENCE OF THE DECEDENT.

We first address the State's motion to dismiss the appeal.
The State argues that the estate's notice of appeal was untimely
because the trial court dismissed the case with prejudice on May
30, 2000,

and the estate did not file its notice of appeal until

July 28, 2000.

-

The trial court issued the following entry on May 30, 2000:
JE dated 4/20/00 is a final entry.
Remove case from active docket.

-
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On this entry,
prejudice."

the

trial

court marked the box "dismissed with

The record does not support a basis for the court's

marking the box "dismissed with prejudice." There is no evidence
that the parties entered into a settlement agreement after the jury
verdict and Civ.R. 4l(A) (2) and (B) does not provide a basis for
the court's sua sponte dismissing a case with prejudice after a
jury verdict has been entered.

Furthermore,

it appears that the

trial court did not intend the journal entry to have the effect of
a dismissal with prejudice because it proceeded to rule on the
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on July 3, 2000,
after entering the May 30, 2000 journal entry.

-

We, therefore, find the estate's appeal from the date of the
trial court's denial of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict was timely filed.
Although we find no merit to the State's motion to dismiss the
appeal, we nonetheless find that we need not address the estate's
assignments

of

error

because

we

find

that

the

statute

of

limitations has expired on the estate's claim and that the claim
for "wrongful imprisonment" abates upon the death of the individual
who was allegedly wrongfully imprisoned. 2

2

The State raised these arguments in its response brief without
(continued ... )

-
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R.C. 2305.07 states as follows:
Except
as
provided
in
sections
126.301
[126.30.01] and 1302.98 of the Revised Code,
an action upon a contract not in writing,
express or implied, or upon a liability
created by statute other than a forfeiture or
penalty, shall be brought within six years
after the cause of action thereof accrued.
(Emphasis added) .
R.C. 2743.48 was enacted to provide compensation to innocent
persons who have been wrongfully convicted and incarcerated for a
felony. Walden v. State (1989), 47 Ohio St.3d 47, 53.

Without the

enactment of R.C. 2743.48, the State would remain immune from such
lawsuits.

Id.

It

is,

enactment of a statute.
the

statute

of

therefore,

a

claim

derived

Consequently, pursuant to R.C.

limitations

for

filing

a

claim

for

from

the

2305.07,
wrongful

imprisonment is six years. 3
To find that the statute of limitations could extend as long
as

thirty years

after

the person has

been acquitted

leads

to

( ... continued)

filing
appeal
change
of the
court.
175.

a cross appeal. However, pursuant to App.R. 3(C) (2) a cross
is not necessary when the arguments raised do not seek to
the judgment but merely raise alternative grounds in support
judgment that were either ignored or overlooked by the trial
Kaplysh v. Takieddine, et al. (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 170,

Interestingly, the statute of limitations for a common law
cause of action for false imprisonment is one year pursuant to R.C.
2305.ll(A).
3

-
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Many of the witnesses have died and the

evidentiary problems.

surviving witnesses' memories have faded.

The ability to glean the

physical evidence from long ago in a prior proceeding is also a
daunting task. Therefore, based on public policy alone, it could
not have been the intent of the legislature to permit such a cause
of action to be brought without any time limitation whatsoever.
We also find that the claim for wrongful imprisonment abates
upon the death of the individual allegedly wrongfully imprisoned.
R.C.

2305.21

governs

the

survival

of

causes

of

actions

and

provides:

-

In addition to the causes of action which
survive at common law, causes of action for
mesne profits, or injuries to the person or
property, or for deceit or fraud, also shall
survive; and such actions may be brought
notwithstanding the death of the person
entitled or liable thereto.
As we stated above,

the right to sue the State for wrongful

imprisonment was created by R.C. 2743.48.
Before

the

creation of

this

immunity against such suits. Id.

statute,

Walden v. State,

the

State

had

supra.

sovereign

No right existed in common law in

which a wrongfully imprisoned person could pursue an action against
the

State.

Bennett

v.

Ohio

Department

of Reha.bi.Ii ta ti on

and

Correction (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 107, 110; Wright v. State (1990),

-

-
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69 Ohio App.3d 775, 779.

Therefore, the estate's claim does not

survive under the R.C. 2305.21 exception for claims that existed at
common law.
The claim also does not qualify as "injuries to the person"
under R.C.

2305.21.

Ohio law has held that

person" means physical injuries.

"injuries

to the

Witcher v. Fairlawn (1996), 113

Ohio App.3d 214, 217; Oakwood v. Makar (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 46,
47.

The

injury

caused

by

being wrongfully

imprisoned

violation of one's personal rights, not a physical injury.
Witcher,

supra.

is

a

See,

(Torts such as false imprisonment and malicious

prosecution do not survive because they are violations of personal
rights, not physical injuries).
Further, R.C. 2743.48 states in relevant part:
(A) As used in this section, a "wrongfully
imprisoned individual" means an individual who
satisfies each of the following:
( 1) He was charged with a violation of a
section of the Revised Code by an indictment
or information prior to, or on or after,
September 24, 1986, and the violation charged
was an aggravated felony or felony.
(2) He was found guilty of, but did not plead
guilty to,
the particular charge
or a
lesser-included offense by the court or jury
involved, and the offense of which he was
found guilty was an aggravated felony or
felony.

-
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(3) He was sentenced to an indefinite or
definite term of imprisonment in a state
correctional institution for the offense of
which he was found guilty.
( 4)
·rhe individual's
reversed on appeal ***·

conviction

***

was

(5) Subsequent to his sentencing and during or
subsequent
to
his
imprisonment,
it
was
determined by a court of common pleas that the
offense of which he was
found guilty,
including all lesser-included offenses, either
was not committed by him or was not committed
by any person.
This statute clearly only refers to the individual who was
actually imprisoned. As the court held in Wright,

supra at 781,

-

"It is not the judiciary's function to rewrite laws according to
what the court perceives as just but to enforce the literal writing
of

the statute whenever possible.

Budget Comm.

Bd.

(1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 147.

of Edn.

v.

Fulton Cty.

Regardless of the method

of interpretation used, absent ambiguity, a court will not delve
into the legislative intent but will give effect
meaning of the statute

* * *.

11

to the plain

The administrator of the estate

cannot meet any of the requirements of the "individual

11

as set

forth in R.C. 2743.48(A) (1) through (4).
Because the statute of limitations expired on the estate's
claim and because the claim abated upon the death of Samuel H.

-

-11Sheppard, we find that the State's motion to dismiss should have
been granted.
Since we find the matter should not have proceeded to trial,
the assignments of error raised by the estate are moot and need not
be addressed.

App.R. 12(A) (1) (c)

Judgment affirmed.

·-,- :

. i

•. ·-\

.-~-,-·

'I

. l

.': <. -

.1·,;;:

~-.r
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It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs
herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for.this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court
directing the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this
judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMQN, P.J. and
JAMES J. SWEENEY_._ J. CONCUR

COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY

ANNOUNCEMENT OF DECISION
PER APP. R. 22(8), 22(0) AND 26(A)

RECeIVED

FEB 2 l 2002
GERAL.O E. F'UEAST
CLERK OF THE COURT OF .1.PPEALS
BY

---··.

~-Dl!P.

N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court's decision. See App.R.
22(B), 22(D) and 26(A); Loc.App.R. 22. This decision will be journalized
and will become the judgment and order of the court pursuant to App.R.
22 (E) ·unless a motion for reconsideration with supporting brief, per
App.R. 26(A), is filed within ten (10) days of the announcement of the
court's decision.
The time period for review by the Supreme Co-qrt of
Ohio shall begin to run upon the journalization of this court 1 s
announcement of decision by the clerk per App.R. 22 (E).
See, also,
S.Ct.Prac.R. II, Section 2(A) (1).

